THE PRINCIPLE OF INERTIA IS RELATIVELY/FUNCTIONALLY A PRIORI?

constitutive aspects of scientific knowledge and the functional theory of the a priori

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v8i16.26983

Keywords:

Philosophy of Science. Relativized A Priori. Functional Theory of the A Priori. Michael Friedman. Arthur Pap.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to do a rational reconstruction and critical appropriation of the characterization of the status of the principle of inertia given by Arthur Pap’s functional theory of the a priori (1943, 1944, [1946] 1968). The goal is to revitalize the author, someone who stayed overlooked in a debate in which his work shows itself to be fertile. We present the functional theory of the a priori in general lines, as well as the debate that characterizes the knowledge of the more basic principles of the natural sciences as functionally/relatively a priori. After some background, we characterize the principle of inertia in a contextual manner: in the context in which the principle of inertia is taken as a criterion to determine “real movements” of objects, the Newtonian physics, such principle is functionally a priori. In the sense of a condition to cognitive access or intelligibility, it functions as if were a priori (in other words, it is constitutive of the known objects).

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Author Biography

Jeferson Diello Huffermann, State University of Rio Grande do Sul

Doutorando do Programa de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Mestre em Filosofia pela UFRGS (2019), onde defendeu a dissertação "Aspectos constitutivos do conhecimento científico a partir da teoria funcional do a priori", escrita com auxílio de bolsa de pesquisa do CNPq. Licenciado em Filosofia pela UFRGS, instituição na qual foi bolsista do Programa Institucional de Bolsas de Iniciação à Docência - PIBID/UFRGS no subprojeto da Filosofia (2013) e no subprojeto Interdisciplinar Campus do Vale (2014 e 2015) e bolsista de iniciação científica CAPES/PROCAD (2016). Atuou como Professor Substituto do Ensino Básico e Profissional no Colégio de Aplicação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (CAp/UFRGS) em turmas de Ensino Médio (2017). Atualmente pesquisa relações entre teorias enativistas da percepção e debates em Epistemologia acerca da correta caracterização do conhecimento proposicional perceptual, com auxílio de bolsa de pesquisa CAPES.

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Published

2019-08-31

How to Cite

Huffermann, J. D. (2019). THE PRINCIPLE OF INERTIA IS RELATIVELY/FUNCTIONALLY A PRIORI? constitutive aspects of scientific knowledge and the functional theory of the a priori. PÓLEMOS – Revista De Estudantes De Filosofia Da Universidade De Brasília, 8(16), 75–98. https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v8i16.26983

Issue

Vol. 8 No. 16 (2019)

Section

Artigos

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