THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF REALISM

Abstract

This paper seeks to discuss the problem of realism, more precisely it seeks to discuss the approach commonly known as “natural realism” and the form of anti-realism proposed by Michael Dummett. The paper privileges these two positions due to one extremely simple reason: those two seem to exemplify and contrast the issues regarding the foundations of the problem of realism. The purpose of this work then is to make an exposition which will show how based on an assumption regarding a fundamental question, namely the question of how should be a theory of perception, and the regarding of this question as thoroughly settled and undisputed, Putnam and Dummett will both go to construct radically different theories, one who will be called a form of naïve realism the other Dummett’s anti-realism, which we content are still genuine alternatives one to another. In this sense what this works proposes to do is to show the following: The argumentation in favor of each theory is founded on the axiomatic presupposition, of a given theory of perception and furthermore the rejection of a given theory in favor of another can equally take us from one theory to another without incurring in argumentative inconsistency.