Hábito, habitus e reflexividade

um diálogo experimental entre praxiologia e pragmatismo

Abstract

The article explores ways through which practice theory and (neo)pragmatist theories of action can be synthesized into an integrated model of the subjective engines of social conduct. On one hand, pragmatists like John Dewey show that mismatches between habitual dispositions and social circumstances, requiring a greater role of reflective *logos* over habitual praxis, are not limited to radical crisis scenarios — what Pierre Bourdieu called “hysteresis” — but are part of agents' everyday experience. On the other hand, Bourdieusian praxeology captures the creative component of habitual dispositions themselves and may also combine a non-mechanistic notion of “habit,” as proposed by Dewey, with the concept of habitus as a system of habits internalized in subjectivity. Inspired jointly by Dewey and Bourdieu, the article finally discusses the role of reflexivity informed by science in transforming habitual dispositions.