Idealization and Uniqueness in Peer Disagreements: The Case of Religious Disagreement

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss two important topics for religious disagreement, namely, idealization and uniqueness. In the literature on disagreements, there is an idealized notion of epistemic symmetry, however, this idealized scenario perhaps it is not the best way tounderstand actual disputes between peers. Another important point is the uniqueness thesis, this principle says that a body of evidence supports only one doxastic attitude or only one proposition. Thus, with this principle in mind, authors like Richard Feldman have askeptical view on disagreements. He says that, in cases of peer disagreements, both agentsshould abandon their beliefs and suspend judgment, since the evidence does not justify two competing beliefs at the same time. In Feldman’s opinion, this is also sound for thereligious disagreement. Nevertheless, we can contest the uniqueness thesis, arguing in favor of permissiveness of evidence, this thesis on the contrary claims that a particular body ofevidence supports competing beliefs at the same time. Therefore, with a permissiveness principle in mind, I will argue that both agents in a dispute can be justified. In a religious disagreement, for example, both an atheist and a theist can be justified in maintaining the irrespective beliefs.