Sistemas de referências, práticas epistêmicas e teísmo cristão
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842023e55224Keywords:
Wittgenstein, hingesAbstract
In this article, following and developing some of Wittgenstein´s insights about religion and the structure of reason, I argue that religious beliefs are complex systems of representations that inform not only the way of thinking and assessing the world but also of living of a religious believer. One of the promising consequences of a similar account is that it can help us to address the challenge to religious beliefs posed by Classic Evidentialism. Roughly, according to the evidentialist challenge, religious beliefs such as the belief in the Resurrection of Christ and in the existence and Trinitarian Nature of the God of Christian Theism are epistemically irrational, as they are not based on evidence or reasons. Using and developing some of the ideas presented by Wittgenstein in On Certainty and the anti-skeptical “Wittgensteinia” works of Duncan Pritchard and Crispin Wright, I aim to show that the Evidentialist challenge is totally misguided. This is because following and developing the theses presented in these works, I aim to show that both our epistemic practices and our religious systems of reference are based on “hinges “which cannot and do not need to be supported by evidence or reasons. Hence, we have a rational entitlement to believe in these hinges, as long as there is no extant evidence against them and if they are necessary in order to pursue a project that is either unavoidable or sufficiently valuable to us. Finally, I argue that we have a rational entitlement to believe in the “hinges “of Roman Catholicism, as the beliefs of this “system of representation “are not in contrast with our epistemic practices.
References
REFERÊNCIAS
BANNER, M.C. The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
CLACK, B. An Introduction to Wittgenstein, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
COLIVA, A. Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist, in: Philosophical Investigations, vol. 33, ed. 1, 2010b.
COLIVA, A. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.
FOLEY, R. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987.
JENKINS, C. Entitlement and Rationality, Syntheses v. 157, p. 25-45, 2007.
KOJONEN, E. The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of Scientism, London/New York: Routledge, 2016.
LEHRER, K. ‘Rationality’, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), p. 206–19 (Oxford: Blackwell), 1999.
MCGINN, M. Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Skepticism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1898.
MALCOLM, N. Thought and Knowledge: essays. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977.
MOORE, G. E. A defense of Common Sense, in Contemporary British Philosophers, reprinted in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, London: Collier Books (1962), 1925.
MOORE, G. E. Proof of an external world, Proceedings of the British academy, reprinted in Philosophical Papers, 1939.
MOYAL-SHARROCK, D. Understanding Wittgenstein’s on Certainty, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
NEWMAN, J.H. (1870), An essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. I.T. Kerr, Oxford: Oxford University Press
NIELSEN, K. Wittgensteinianism Fideism, Philosophy, 42: 191–209, 1967.
NIELSEN, K. and PHILLIPS, D.Z. Wittgensteinian Fideism? London: SCM Press, 2005.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. Belief, Change, and Forms of Life: The Confusions of Externalism and Internalism, in Frederick Crosson (ed.), The Autonomy of Religious Belief, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Pres: 60–92, 1981.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. Belief, Change and Forms of Life, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1986.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. “Religious Beliefs and Language-Games,” in Wittgenstein and Religion, New York: St. Martin’s Press: p. 56–78, 1993.
PLANTINGA, A. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993a.
PLANTINGA, A. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993b.
PLANTINGA, A. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
PRITCHARD, D.H. Exploring Quasi-Fideism, Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis, Ch. 2, London: Anthem, 2022a.
PRITCHARD, D.H. “Quasi-Fideism and Epistemic Relativism”, Inquiry, 2022b.
PRITCHARD, D.H. “Skeptical Fideism and Quasi-Fideism’, Manuscript 44, 2021.
PRITCHARD, D.H. Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion vol. 10, 2018.
PRITCHARD, D.H. Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2015.
PRITCHARD, D. H. “Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing”, in Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism and Perceptual Justification, D. Dodd & E. Zardini (eds.), Oxford UP, 2014.
PRITCHARD, D.H. “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism”, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion vol. 4, 2011.
PRITCHARD, D. H. “Wittgenstein’s on Certainty and contemporary anti-skepticism”, in Readings of Wittgenstein’s on Certainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.), London: Palgrave, p. 189-224, 2005.
PUTNAM, H. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
SCHROEDER, S. The Tightrope Walker, Ratio, Vol. XX, no 4, 2007.
WILLIAMSON, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
WILLIAMS, M. Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism, in Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. McManus (ed.), London, New York, Routledge, p. 76–96, 2004a.
WILLIAMS, M. Wittgenstein, Truth and Certainty, in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, M. Kolbel, B. Weiss (eds.), Routledge, London, 2004b.
WILLIAMS, M. Why Wittgenstein isn’t a Foundationalist, in Readings of Wittgenstein’s on Certainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W. H. Brenner (eds.), p. 47–58, 2005.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1997), Denkbewegungen. Tagebücher 1930–1932/1936–1937 (MS 183), ed.: I. Somavilla, Innsbruck: Haymon, 1997. [Quoted by MS page numbers.], 1997.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Culture and Value, ed. G.H.von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, trans. P. Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); rev. edn ed. Alois Pichler Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Notebooks 1914–16, ed. G.H.von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1961.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trad. D.Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trad. Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos, 3ª ed. São Paulo. Editora Edusp, 2017
WITTGENSTEIN, L., 2009. Philosophical Investigations, revised 4th ed., edited by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell., 2009
WRIGHT, C. Warrant for nothing (and foundation for free)? Aristotelian society Supplement, Vol. 78, No. 1, p. 167–212, 2004a.
WRIGHT, C. Wittgensteinian Certainties, in Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. McManus (ed.), 22–55, 2004b.
WRIGHT, C. (2004c). ‘Hinge Propositions and the Serenity Prayer’, Knowledge and Belief, Proceedings of he 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, (eds.) W. Loffler & P. Weingartner, 287–306, Vienna, Austria: Holder-Pickler-Tempsky
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Nicola Salvatore
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
