The Basicality of the Theistic Belief and the Burden of Proof

Abstract

In this article I argue that the proper basicality of the theistic belief results in the shifting of the burden of proof in the debate about the existence of God. The attribution of the burden of proof to the believer is based on the evidentialist assumption that belief in God is not basic, which is made possible by the current hegemony of naturalism in the academic sphere. Denying this assumption is denying that attribution. In addition to making explicit the determining role of the hegemony of beliefs in the attribution of the burden of proof, I also defend the need for natural theology in its defensive aspect, and I attempt to show that this need was already admitted among the most eminent natural theologians. On the other hand, the need for propositional argumentation, defended through the Great Pumpkin objection, amounts to acceptance of the evidentialist objection and, therefore, to the denial of Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology. Showing that the hegemony of naturalism does not necessarily mean that there are good arguments in its favor and making use of the basicality of the theistic belief defended in the Reformed epistemology, I conclude that it is possible to shift the burden of proof in the specific context in which the believer is accused of irrationality if he does not present arguments that justify his position.