What is the purpose of human dignity? Conceptual crisis and new ways of putting bioethical concepts into practice
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rbb.v3i2.7927Keywords:
Human Dignity. Autonomy. Bioethics. Human Rights.Abstract
Human dignity, the basis for the construction of human rights and even the most recent international declarations on bioethics, has been the subject of severe criticism as a bioethics reference point. Through defining special dignity for the human being, Western philosophy has chosen to adopt an anthropocentric perspective, placing the human being at the center of other beings, such that a privileged ontological status is recognized for human beings. Rethinking the concept of human dignity therefore at the same time signifies renewed discussion on where the human being is placed within the natural system. This has obvious consequences for bioethical evaluations. Although there are signs of a certain weariness in the bioethical literature regarding this debate, it seems to us that discussions about the concept and putting it into practice are not in any way useless. This is both from a practical point of view, since the process of making ethical decisions in many cases continues to refer to human dignity, and from a theoretical point of view, since a certain understanding of human dignity seems to lead directly to anthropocentrism. In fact, imprecise use of the term “dignity”, without clear redefinition of the concept, carries the risk of culminating in the suggestion that it should be replaced by a clearer and more practical concept: autonomy. The present communication proposes to face up to the conceptual question of human dignity by indicating theoretical ways out from the problem. As a relational construction that is expressed through recognition of the other person, dignity may be thought of in a more comprehensive and complex manner than can the concept of the principle of autonomy. In defining dignity as a linguistic code and putting it into practice, the desire is to incorporate individual, social and cultural diversity. Human dignity can thus survive the recent criticism that suggested it is useless, in the form of a reference point for the value of certain ethical and cultural traits of human beings for which defense and preservation are desired.
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