THE PHILOSOPHER’S SILENCE

some remarks on Wittgenstein's epistemological silence

Abstract

The article proposes to understand the question of silence in Wittgenstein as a constant trait of his thought, from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations. In the first two moments, the text explores the two phases of the author's philosophy, which are divided into “earlier” and “later Wittgenstein”, to show the relationship between silence and his thought; in the third moment, an attempt is made to highlight some dissimilarities in the treatment of the theme. With the exposition, the article proposes to interpret Wittgenstein's philosophical silence as epistemological silence, which is exactly the point defended here as a trait that remains constant in the author's reflections. The epistemological silence says a lot about Wittgenstein's relationship with philosophy and language, which is why it can be understood as a possible key to reading Wittgenstein's philosophy.