WILLIAM ROWE'S EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL AND STEPHEN WYKSTRA'S RESPONSE FROM SKEPTICAL THEISM
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v10i21.37807Keywords:
God. Evidence. Evil. Rationality. Theism.Abstract
This article aims to analyze the evidential version of the problem of evil critically. According to the evidential problem, even if the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and extremely good being is logically compatible with the existence of evil, it is still problematic and seems to offer a evidence against its existence. The argument affirms that specific facts about evil provide rational support for the belief that the theistic God does not exist. William Rowe has influentially defended the evidential problem, and it is to his formulation that we pay attention. We present a prominent theistic reply. We develop and defend Stephen Wykstra's reply, which became known as Skeptic Theism. Specifically, we focus on his analysis of the use of "seem" when Rowe uses in his argument affirming that there are cases of suffering that do not seem to enable any greater good. Through this analysis of Wykstra, we conclude that Rowe is not justified in making this use of "seem" and that, thus, one of the fundamental steps of Rowe's argument is without justification. In this way, we conclude that the evidential argument, as formulated by Rowe, fails to object to the rationality of belief in God.
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References
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WYKSTRA. “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” In: HOWARD-SNYDER, D. (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil, 1996, ch.7, pp. 126–50.
WYKSTRA. “A Skeptical Theist View” In: MEISTER, C.; K. D., James (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil: Five Views. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2017, pp. 96-123.
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