From Mental Phenomena to Propositional Attitudes: The Transformation of the Concept of Intentionality from Brentano to Chisholm
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42921Mots-clés :
Intentionality. Propositional Attitudes. Brentano. Russell. Chisholm.Résumé
The article presents a historical but mainly conceptual comparison of two (quite) different views of intentionality: one introduced by Franz Brentano and based on a descriptive- psychological perspective of mental life, and another conducted by Roderick Chisholm and ruled by a logico-linguistic viewpoint. In spite of Chisholm’s continuous references to Brentano, I will claim that the former conceptually breaks with the latter, as he introduces several (clearly non-Brentanian) conceptual tools mainly borrowed from Bertrand Russell’s philosophy, which exerted a decisive influence on some theoretical decisions taken by Chisholm. This is the case, for instance, of using the (Russellian) concept of propositional attitudes for understanding intentionality. I will argue that this interpretation is based on a strong logico-linguistic commitment, which is not merely a methodological strategy, but it is also grounded on a fully different philosophical standpoint other than the one first inaugurated by Brentano.
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