Artificial Intelligence as a pragmatic metavocabulary in Robert Brandom
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v13i2.55078Keywords:
Artificial Intelligence. Frame Problem. Robert Brandom. Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Abstract
Classical Artificial Intelligence has a foundational place in Brandom: the practices whose domain constitutes the possession of a vocabulary are the application of a series of algorithms. Making explicit these algorithms provides an explanation for Brandom’s project of bringing the inferential commitments implicit in our practices into the game of giving and receiving reasons. This project fails for a reason well known in AI, the frame problem. Brandom proposes a solution to the frame problem through learning by training. Brandom’s proposal comes close to neural networks developed through machine learning. While this approach does not allow us to maintain the Brandomian framework of Between Saying and Doing, the parallel with Making it Explicit brings an important parallel with the project of Explainable Artificial Intelligence, namely making explicit the implicit inferential commitments of decision-making processes that affect our common life.
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