Meaning-theoretical conditions and Verification
a defense of Dummett against Alfred Tarski
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v12i2.53158Keywords:
Meaning-theory. Verification. Dummett. Tarski.Abstract
In the upcoming article, we will explore a critique of Dummett's towards Tarski that has often been overlooked or not fully appreciated. Dummett's verificationist anti-realism serves as the foundation for the critique. According to this author, a theory of meaning for a particular language—which are found in a theory of harmony—determine the circumstances in which the meaning of a sentence of the language can be theorized, or presented in a strategic and non-defeating theoretical depiction of its possible assertion. These prerequisites create a mediating bridge between the statement of a sentence and its effects, defining the circumstances in which the incompatibility of "p" and "not-p" can be considered and projected. Tarski is criticized for his formal and material semantic theory of truth, which hides or masks the epistemic circumstances by presenting them in a straightforward and codified manner in inductive principles.
References
CHIFFI, D. & GIORGIO, A. (2017). Assertions and Conditionals: A Historical and Pragmatic Stance. Studia Humana. 6. 10.1515/sh-2017-0004, 2017.
DAVIDSON, D. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2001.
DUMMETT, M. The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic. In: Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard UP. pp. 215–247 1975.
DUMMETT, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth. 1973.
DUMMETT, M. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 1983.
DUMMETT, M. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press. 1993.
DUMMETT, M. Origins of analytical philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996.
DUMMETT, M. Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59(1), p. 141–62. 1958.
FERREIROS, J; RECK, Erick H. Dedekind’s Mathematical Structuralism: From Galois Theory to Numbers, Sets, and Functions. The Prehistory of Mathematical Structuralism. Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2020.
FREGE, G. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle a. S.: Louis Nebert, 1979. in T.W. Bynum (ed. and trans.), Frege: Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.
FREGE, G. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Hrsg. J. Schulte. Stuttgart, Reclam, 1987
FREGE, G. Sense and Reference. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (May,1948), pp. 209-230. 1948.
GEACH, P. “Assertion”, The Philosophical Review 74 (4): 449–465, 1965.
GENTZEN, G. Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. I. Mathematische Zeitschrift 35:176–210. 1935.
HACKING, I. “What Is Logic?”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 285–319. 1979.
HORWICH, P. Truth. In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272, 1999.
LEPORE, E. Truth in Meaning. In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 3–25, 1989.
KANT, I. Critique of Pure Reason. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant (P. Guyer and A. Wood, Eds.). Cambridge University Press. 1981.
KRIPKE, S.. The Road to Gödel. In Jonathan Berg (ed.), Naming, Necessity and More: Explorations in the Philosophical Work of Saul Kripke. Palgrave-Macmillan. 223–241, 1914.
MAUDLIN, T. Truth and Paradox. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 2004.
PEACOCKE, C. “Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 73: 153–200. 1987.
PRAWITZ, D. Meaning and proofs: On the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic. Theoria, 43, 1–40.1977.
QUINE, W. V. Truth and Disquotation. In: The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press. 1994.
SMITH, B. C. Frege and Chomsky: Sense and Psychologism. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25–46. 1995.
TARSKI, A. The semantic conception of truth: and the foundations of semantics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3), 341–376, 1944.
TARSKI, A. Truth and proof. Scientific American, 220 6, 63-77, 1969.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1922). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Filosoficky Casopis 52, 336-341.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Copyright for articles published in this journal is retained by the authors, with first publication rights granted to the journal. By virtue of their appearance in this open access journal, articles are free to use, with proper attribution, in educational and other non-commercial settings.
