Understanding and Involvement with Art from the Second-Person Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i1.41039Keywords:
Empathy. Simulation. Postcognitivism. Social Cognition. Expression.Abstract
This paper shows that the second-person perspective of mental attribution (Pérez 2013 and Pérez and Gomila 2021) can contribute to illuminate our understanding and involvement with art. A canonical way of understanding our involvement with art focuses on the notion of empathy, which is also considered a central notion to account for our access to other minds. In the first part of this paper, I briefly review this notion and I connect it with recent works in the field of philosophy of art in which a simulationist theory is adopted, both to account for our understanding of other people’s minds and for understanding aesthetic experiences. Secondly, I show the limitations that these notions (empathy and simulation) have to account for our understanding and involvement both with other human beings and with art and I briefly expose the central thesis of the second person perspective of psychological attribution. Finally, I show why the second-person perspective is more adequate to account for the many and multifaceted experiences that arise with art and artistic activities.
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