Aristotle on μετὰ λόγου capacities and voluntary animal locomotion. Part one: the psychic arguments
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_35_24Palavras-chave:
Aristotle, Voluntary, Locomotion, CapacitiesResumo
According to the dominant interpretation of the distinction between capacities that are “without-λόγος” (ἄλογοι) and capacities that are “with-λόγος” (μετὰ λόγου, Metaph. 9.2 1046a34-b2), the latter would be unique to human beings. We can find four arguments in defense of that thesis in the secondary bibliography. This article begins to mount a defense of an alternative reading of Aristotle’s theory that deals with two of these arguments. It will be succeeded by a second article that will deal with the other two arguments and present a positive argument for the alternative reading that tries to make it seem plausible - although not unassailable - in light of its own merits. According to this alternative reading, it is with the framework provided by Aristotle to explain the functioning of bidirectional capacities that we must explain the functioning of the capacity responsible for producing voluntary locomotion in all animals.
Referências
AQUINAS, S. T. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Vol. II Chicago, H. Regnery Company.
AQUINAS, S. T. (1999). Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Translated by C. I. Litzinger. Notre Dame, Dumb Ox.
ANGIONI, L. (trad.) (2004). Aristóteles. Metafísica, Livros IX e X São Paulo, IFCH/UNICAMP.
APOSTLE, H. G. (trad.) (1975). Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics London, Reidel.
BALME, D. M.; LENNOX, J. (trad.) (1991). Aristotle. History of Animals, Volume III: Books 7-10 London, Harvard University Press.
BEERE, J. (2009). Doing and Being an Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta New York, Oxford University Press.
BLOCK, I. (1964). Three German Commentators on the Individual Senses and the Common Sense in Aristotle’s Psychology. Phronesis, 9, n. 1, p. 58-63.
BLOCK, I. (1988). Aristotle on the common sense: A reply to Kahn and others. Ancient Philosophy, 8, p. 235-249.
CHARLTON, W. (trad.) (2014). Philoponus. On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8 London, Bloomsbury.
CHARLES, D. (2020). Aristotle on the Perception of Objects. In: GUYOMARC’H, G.; LOUGUET, C.; MURGIER, C. (eds.). Aristote et l’âme Humaine. Lectures de “De Anima” III Offertes à Michel Crubellier Leuven, Peeters Publishers & Booksellers, p. 19-38.
CONNELL, S. M. (2021). Animal Cognition in Aristotle. In: CONNELL, S. M. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Biology Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 195-210.
CONNELL, S. M. (2024). Aristotle on Memory and Emotion in Human and Non-Human Animals. In: KAZANTZIDIS, G.; SPATHARAS, D. (eds.). Memory and Emotions in Antiquity Berlin; Boston, De Gruyter, p. 129-152.
CORCILIUS, K. (2011). Untitled. In: MILLER, J. (ed.). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 117-143.
CORCILIUS, K. (2020). De Anima III 7: The Actuality Principle and the Triggering of Mental Episodes. In: GUYOMARC’H, G.; LOUGUET, C.; MURGIER, C. (eds.). Aristote et l’âme Humaine. Lectures de “De Anima” III Offertes à Michel Crubellier . Leuven, Peeters Publishers & Booksellers , p. 185-220.
CORCILIUS, K. (2022). The Gate to Reality: Aristotle’s Basic Account of Perception. In: COHOE, C. (ed.). Aristotle’s On the Soul Cambridge, Cambridge University Press , p. 122-154.
CORCILIUS, K.; GREGORIC, P. (2010). Separability Vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle. Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy , 39, p. 81-120.
CORCILIUS, K.; PERLER, D. (2014). Introduction. In: CORCILIUS, K.; PERLER, D. (eds.). Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz Berlin; Boston, De Gruyter , p. 1-14.
GREGORIC, P. (2007). Aristotle on the Common Sense Oxford, Oxford University Press .
HETT, W. S. (trad.) (1957). Aristotle. On the Soul; Parva Naturalia; On Breath London, Harvard University Press .
HICKS, R. D. (ed./trad.) (1907). Aristotle. De Anima Cambridge, Cambridge University Press .
JOHANSEN, T. K. (2012). The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul Oxford, Oxford University Press.
KAHN, C. H. (1966). Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology. Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie, 48, n. 1-3, p. 43-81.
KOSMAN, L. A. (1975). Perceiving That We Perceive: On the Soul III, 2. The Philosophical Review, 84, n. 4, p. 499-519.
LABARRIÈRE, J.-L. (1990). De La Phronèsis Animale. In: DEVEREUX, D.; PELLEGRIN, P. (eds.). Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique Chez Aristote Paris, CNRS.
LABARRIÈRE, J.-L. (2004). Langage, vie politique et mouvement des animaux: études aristotéliciennes Paris, Vrin.
LENNOX, J. (2015). Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue: The Natural History of Natural Virtue. In: HENRY, D.; NIELSEN, K. M. (eds.). Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics Cambridge, Cambridge University Press , p. 193-213.
LENNOX, J. (1991). Notes. In: BALME, D. M.; LENNOX, J. (trad.). Aristotle. History of Animals , Volume III: Books 7-10 London, Harvard University Press.
LENNOX, J. G. (trad.) (2001). Aristotle. On the Parts of Animals New York, Oxford University Press .
LOUIS, P. (1969). Notes. In: LOUIS, P. (trad.). Aristote. Histoire des animaux Tome III: Livres VIII-X Paris, Les Belles Lettres.
MAKIN, S. (ed.) (2006). Aristotle. Metaphysics: Book Theta Oxford, Clarendon Press.
MOSS, J. (2014). Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Phronesis Phronesis , 59, n. 3, p. 181-230.
MOVIA, G. (ed.) (2007). Alessandro di Afrodisia. Commentario alla "Metafisica" di Aristotele Milano, Bompiani.
NASCIMENTO, D. S. (2017). Desejo e cognição na teoria aristotélica dos movimentos voluntários de locomoção animal. Filosofia Unisinos, 18, n. 2, p. 70-78.
OWEN, G. E. L. (1984). Book Theta, Chapter II. In: BURNYEAT, M. (ed.). Notes on Books Eta and Theta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Oxford, Sub-faculty of Philosophy, p. 52-58.
POLANSKY, R. M. (2007). Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary Cambridge, Cambridge University Press .
PRIMAVESI, O.; MORISON, B. (trad.) (2020). Aristotle. De Motu Animalium. In: RAPP, C. (ed.). Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Symposium Aristotelicum Oxford, Oxford University Press.
RACKHAM, H. (trad.) (1926). Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics . London, Harvard University Press .
RACKHAM, H. (trad.) (1932). Aristotle. Politics London, Harvard University Press .
REEVE, C. D. C. (2017). Notes. In: REEVE, C. D. C. (trad.). Aristotle. De Anima . Indianapolis, Hackett, p. 67-198.
RODIER, G. (1900). Commentaire du Traité de l’âme Paris, J. Vrin.
SAINT-HILAIRE, J. B. (1879). Metaphysique d’Aristote, Vol. II. Livres IV-IX Paris, Librairie Germer-Baillière et Cie.
SCHEITER, K. M. (2012). Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle. Phronesis , 57, n. 3, p. 251-278.
SCHNIEDERS, S. (2019a). Einleitung. In: SCHNIEDERS, S. (ed.). Aristotle. Historia Animalium Book VIII Und IX Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 97-244.
SCHNIEDERS, S. (2019b). Kommentar. In: SCHNIEDERS, S. (ed.). Aristotle. Historia Animalium . Book VIII Und IX Berlin, De Gruyter , p. 315-1090.
SHIELDS, C. J. (2016). Commentary. In: SHIELDS, C. J. (ed./trad.). Aristotle. De Anima . New York, Oxford University Press , p. 79-380.
SORABJI, R. (1993). Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate New York, Cornell University Press.
STEEL, C. (trad.) (2014). Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Soul 3.6-13 London, Bloomsbury .
SUÁREZ, F. (2004). A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Milwaukee, Marquette University Press.
THEMISTIUS. (1990). Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle De Anima 3.4-8. In: SCHROEDER, F. M.; TODD, R. B. (trad.). Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect: The De Intellectu Attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle De Anima, 3.4-8 Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
TREDENNICK, H. (trad.) (2003). Aristotle. Metaphysics: Books 1-9 Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
WHITING, J. (2002). Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle’s Scientific Works. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 22, p. 141-200.
WOODS, M. (ed./trad.) (1992). Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II, and VIII New York, Oxford University Press .
ZATTA, C. (2022). Aristotle and the Animals: The Zōē of Life Itself Abingdon, Routledge.
Downloads
Publicado
Edição
Seção
Licença
Copyright (c) 2025 Daniel Simão Nascimento
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Dado o acesso público desta revista, os textos são de uso gratuito, com obrigatoriedade de reconhecimento da autoria original e da publicação inicial nesta revista. O conteúdo das publicações é de total e exclusiva responsabilidade dos autores.
1. Os autores autorizam a publicação do artigo na revista.
2. Os autores garantem que a contribuição é original, responsabilizando-se inteiramente por seu conteúdo em caso de eventual impugnação por parte de terceiros.
3. Os autores garantem que a contribuição que não está em processo de avaliação em outras revistas.
4. Os autores mantêm os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, sendo o trabalho licenciado sob a Creative Commons Attribution License-BY.
5. Os autores têm permissão e são estimulados a publicar e distribuir seu trabalho on-line após a publicação na revista.
6. Os autores dos trabalhos aprovados autorizam a revista a, após a publicação, ceder seu conteúdo para reprodução em indexadores de conteúdo, bibliotecas virtuais e similares.
7. É reservado aos editores o direito de proceder ajustes textuais e de adequação do artigo às normas da publicação.
